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1. Introduction  
1.1 Natech events 
The term “Natech” refers to natural disasters triggering technological accidents. In fact, 
because of the interaction between the natural and the industrial risk it is possible that 
several effects take place in industrial plants and in the storage sites, causing for 
example damage to pipelines, to process equipment, to storage tanks and consequently 
the release of hazardous materials. 
 
There are different kinds of natural events or, in general terms, of natural causes of 
industrial accidents (landslides, hurricanes, high winds, tsunamis, lightning, cold/hot 
temperature, floods, heavy rains etc.), nevertheless in the present study the attention is 
focused only on seismic and flood events. In fact, several accidents occurred in the last 
decades in industrial sites evidenced that typology of natural phenomena may cause 
severe damages to equipment items, resulting in losses of containment, thus in multiple 
and extended releases of hazardous substances. Because of these multiple and 
simultaneous failures with release, cascading events are more likely to occur during a 
natural disaster than during normal plant operation. Some examples of Natech events 
like the flood in the Samir refinery in Mohammedia, Morocco, in 2002 (Krausmann et al. 
2007) or the Kocaeli earthquake in Turkey in 1999 are available in the scientific literature 
or in the accident databases (Figures 1-3). In both cases the natural event occurred in a 
refinery and involved several storage equipment items and generated fires and 
explosions. These reports allow to better understand the particular severity of the 
industrial accidents triggered by flood and seismic events (ARIA 2006, DFC 2003, 
MARS 2006, MHIDAS 2001, NRC 2007, Reinders et al. 2003, TAD 2004). 
 
The reference for the prevention of chemical accident in the European Commission is 
the Seveso Directive II (96/82/EC). The aim of the Seveso Directive is “Prevent Major 
accidents which involve dangerous substances and to limit their consequences for man 
and environment with a view to ensuring high levels of protection throughout Community 
in a consistent and effective manner” (Council Directive 1996). 
 
The Seveso Directive is addressed indirectly to Natech risk management; in fact it calls 
for the analysis of the external events in “The identification and accidental risk analysis 
and prevention methods”. The analysis of external events which can lead to chemical 
accident implies the consideration of the potential threat of natural hazards in the hazard 
analysis, and carrying out mitigation measures in case an accident occurs (Cruz et al. 
2004). Nevertheless the methodologies and the actions that can be taken to achieve 
these requirements are not specified and limited work has been devoted to the 
development of quantitative assessment procedures for Natech risk. 
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Figure 1.Fire in the refinery due to earthquakes.(Turkey, 1999) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.Flood impact in a refinery 
 
 
 
Figure 3.Hydrocarbons spread by floodwaters  
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1.2 Aim of the work 
Since there are different kinds of natural events and the consequences of their impact on 
the industrial sites can vary depending on the natural phenomena, it could be useful to 
develop a general and unified framework for the assessment of the risk due to Natech 
events in order to have an only approach of effect/impact analysis for every case of 
natural cause. The aim is to implement a procedure for the assessment of the 
contribution of Natech events to standard industrial risk indices beside the QRA 
(quantitative risk analysis). Figure 4 shows an example of the general procedure to 
assess Natech risk (Antonioni et.al 2007, Cozzani et al. 2007). 
 
 
Figure 4.Procedure for the assessment of the industrial risk caused by natural events. 
 
As we can see in this figure the framework is general but in two steps (the first and the 
fourth) some parameters specific for the considered natural event need to be inserted. 
The aim is to arrive at the quantification of the value of the industrial risk indices, but this 
requires applying in the fourth step specific sub-models in order to describe the 
vulnerability of every equipment item target of the natural event.  
In Figure 5 an example of fragility curves is shown. 
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Figure 5. Seismic fragility curves for some equipment items 
 
Those simplified empirical equipment vulnerability models are based on observational 
data and allow in the case of seismic events to evaluate the damage probability for 
different kind of equipment items (Campedel et al. 2007). Therefore, in the case of 
earthquake it is already possible to obtain the values of the industrial risk indices, 
although these models need to be improved in order to increase their reliability. 
 
At present, in the case of a flood event, it is only possible to arrive at a preliminary 
identification of possible damage to equipment and of the consequences of the release 
of hazardous materials, but it is not possible yet to obtain a precise quantification of the 
hazard and risk associated to these events. In fact there are not sufficient data to define 
exactly the damage states and their probability of occurring, so simplified vulnerability 
models are not available yet. Furthermore it is difficult to obtain data about the 
characterization of the flood event, and, as we saw in Figure 4, this represents the first 
step of the developed procedure. 
 
In order to characterize the flood impact vector it is sufficient to refer to two parameters: 
frequency and severity of the flood. The standard parameter for the frequency is the 
return period (Tr) measured in years and given by hydrological studies. Since there are 
different kinds of flood events, for example floodplain inundation with high water level or 
flash flood with high water velocity, we need to distinguish the possible modalities of 
flood impact (slow submersion, moderate speed wave, high speed wave). The flood 
severity can be quantified by two parameters: water depth and water speed. Figure 6 
shows an example of maps with water speed and water depths obtained after a 
simulation of flood scenarios using a two dimensional hydraulic model. 
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Figure 6.Maps with water velocities and water depths obtained with specific software tools. 
 
It is very useful to know the value of the severity parameter because thus it is possible to 
calculate the overall pressure acting on the process/storage equipments items on the 
basis of the hydrostatic and hydrodynamic pressure. 
 
Knowledge of the overall pressure value allows to identify different failure modalities for 
the process/storage vessels. For example, for atmospheric storage tanks it is possible 
that the external pressure leads to collapse of the shell for instability due to reaching the 
critical pressure. Instead, for pressurized horizontal vessels the yielding of support 
structures like the anchorage saddles is possible. Thus the overall pressure value can 
be correlated to different damage modalities. In order to do this the exact damage states 
need to be known and these damage classes need to be correlated to the intensity of 
the severity parameters. Only in this way simplified equipment vulnerability models can 
be developed. Also it is very useful to obtain the threshold limit values for structural 
damage with loss of containment and with consequent release of hazardous materials. 
In the scientific literature some examples are available (DCP 2003): 
• h : High water level condition (h > 1 m and minimum velocity required v = 0.25 
m/s) 
• v : High flow condition (v > 2 m/s and water level h = 0.5 m): support structures 
may start to collapse    
• high risk :h = 1m and v = 1m/s 
But these values are not sufficient to carry out a detailed vulnerability analysis in order to 
develop the “fragility” functions as in the case of seismic events. 
 
A starting point in order to obtain these data and to get a possible correlation between 
data of natural event severity and effects on the equipment items can be the historical 
analysis of past accidents. In fact, the aim would be the review of records on industrial 
accidents triggered by natural events to identify: 
o the categories of equipment more frequently involved in these events 
o the more recurrent damage modalities 
o the associated scenarios  
o a possible correlation between the severity parameter of the natural event and 
the vulnerability of the equipment items in order to develop simplified models. 
 
It was possible to identify different credible ways of structural damage depending on the 
water impact modalities for some storage equipment categories; in Table 1 an example 
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is shown for pressurized vessels: cylindrical vertical vessels, D/H<1 (D is the diameter 
and H the height) and cylindrical horizontal vessels. The results of the historical analysis 
can be useful to confirm these defined correspondences between the damage classes 
and the severity of the flood event.  
 
Table 1.Structural damage modality for pressurized vessels: cylindrical vertical vessels, D/H<1 
and cylindrical horizontal vessels. 
 
Modality water impact Type of Structural damage Release category 
Slow submersion Failure of flanges and connections R3 
moderate speed wave Failure flanges and connections R3 
Shell fracture R2 
Impact with/of adjacent vessels R1 
High speed wave 
Failure of flanges and connections R3 
 
In general terms the accidents involving hazardous materials can have severe 
consequences on the population, on the environment and on property. Therefore it is 
very important to reduce their incidence. The information obtained through the historical 
analysis allows to avoid the recurrence of accidents and to improve the emergency 
response in future accidents. 
1.3 Contents of the report 
This report contains the results obtained through a statistical analysis of past industrial 
accidents triggered by flood and seismic events. On the basis of the records reported in 
the principal accident databases and in other sources it was possible to organize the 
data in pie and histogram charts and in some tables. 
 
The results allowed to confirm some results obtained previously, to highlight new 
aspects and to compare the different effects caused by the two natural events. 
Unfortunately it was not possible to find the specific data that would have allowed the 
quantification of the damage equipment probability. However, the analysis clarified which 
aspects still need to be studied in detail and which way to follow in order to develop 
simplified vulnerability models for the principal equipment items.  
 
2. Retrieval and organization of past accidents data 
2.1 Available data sources 
 
The historical analysis was carried out through the consultation of the principal available 
European chemical accident databases (ARIA, FACTS, MHIDAS, MARS, ICHEME 
database) and of one from the United States (NRC). Different keywords and approaches 
were used because each database presents distinctive characteristics in recording and 
organizing the data. Finally, before to begin the statistical analysis it has been useful to 
make homogeneous the extracted data preparing the Excel files in order to organize the 
records on the basis of the same category of information (date, location, involved 
substance etc.) Only the records related to the Natechs in fixed installations and 
pipelines have been extracted for the analysis. 
 
In Figure 7 the distribution of the identified records among all the analyzed databases 
reported. 
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Figure 7.Distribution of the Natech accident events identified in the analysis of the available 
chemical accident databases: (a) flood events (272 records, 1960-2007), (b) seismic 
events (78 records, 1930-2007). 
 
As it is possible to see the most records are from NRC database, instead in some cases 
there are not data from ARIA or MARS database because their recorded data were 
already extracted previously in other databases. 
 
 ARIA 
The ARIA database (Analyse, Recherche et Information sur les Accidents) is managed 
by the French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development (ARIA 2006). In this 
database it is possible to find the records about actual accidents but also near misses 
which could compromise the health, the public safety, the agriculture, the nature and the 
environment. The information recorded in this database is mainly from the Department of 
Civil Protection and from the French Ministry of the Environment. The recorded 
accidents involve the industrial plants and the farms of the France and of other 
countries. In total, the recorded events are 30859 and only 25361 occurred in France in 
the period from 1900 to 2005. Considering only 2005 the most significant accidents are 
1978 for the French territory and 105 for the other foreign countries. On the basis of a 
detailed analysis previously carried out, the accidents with natural causes represent 5% 
of the records related to 2005 (1978) and 7% of those related to the period from 1992-
2005. Table 2 shows the distribution of the causes for the accidents of which the cause 
is known: 808 records which represent 41% of the events occurred in 2005, and 8538, or 
39% of the accidents occurred between 1992 and 2005.  
 
Table 2. Distribution of the causes of the accidents in the ARIA database. 
 
Principal causes of the accidents 2005 
(%) 
1992-2005 
(%) 
Anomalies in the organization 19 14 
Human error 19 23 
Loss of the process control 8.9 9.7 
Incorrect use of the hazardous materials 3.5 1.7 
Insufficient and inadequate intervention  0.7 1.7 
Dangerous equipments 2.5 3.1 
Lack of feeding 3.8 44 
Lack of utilities 0.7 0.6 
Natural causes 5 7 
External events 1.6 2.2 
NRC; 44; 
56%
FACTS; 1; 
1% MHIDAS; 9; 
11%
ICHEME; 
11; 14%
MARS; 0; 
0%
ALTRO; 14; 
18%
ARIA; 72; 26%
FACTS; 14; 
5%
MHIDAS; 13; 
5%
NRC; 154; 
57%
ALTRO; 6; 2%
ICHEME; 13; 
5%
a) b) 
 10
Principal causes of the accidents 2005 
(%) 
1992-2005 
(%) 
Chronic pollution 0.6 3.1 
Attempts/criminal external attacks 8.3 7.1 
Other causes 2.5 6.7 
 
The historical analysis of the ARIA database was carried out considering the period from 
1900 to 2006 (31 December) and using the following keywords: 
 
o Seismic event: seisme, movement du terrain, troumblement de terre 
o Flood events: precipitations, inundation, crue, debordement 
 
The total number related to accidents caused by natural events is 846 and it covers the 
period form 1948 to 2006. Only 72 records were selected, neglecting events not really 
correlated to a natural event or involving rail/road/ship transport of hazardous materials 
or not actually correlated to industrial installations. 
 
When the records are detailed enough their severity is quantified through the European 
scale shown in the Figure 8.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. European scale of the accidents 
 
For every accident a reference level is assigned to four different parameters: dangerous 
materials released human and social consequences, environmental consequences and 
economic consequences. 
 
FACTS 
The FACTS database (Failure and Accidents Technical information System) is a product 
of TNO industrial and external safety and it contains information on the accidents which 
caused or could cause (near misses) severe consequences. The information stored in 
FACTS is often obtained from professional sources, such as accident reports made by 
companies, government agencies or from publications in technical periodicals and other 
literature. Of course, information from a number of sources is confidential. FACTS 
contains more than 21,600 descriptions of accidents involving hazardous materials. All 
accidents recorded in FACTS are coded in abstracts so as to make the data available for 
the purposes of risk and safety management, risk analyses, damage prevention, training 
and emergency response (FACTS online (website), Reinders et al. 2003). 
 
The accidents retrieved from FACTS are presented on three different informational 
levels. The first level is the 'accident table' containing an overview of the main features of 
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the selected accidents. The second level is the 'accident abstract', containing coded 
identification and a description of the accident. The third and last level is the 'extended 
abstract' which, if available, contains the complete textual information about the 
accident. 
 
In the case of this database it was not possible to consult directly the records because 
FACTS was not available directly, but 30 accidents caused by seismic and flood events 
were found through a publication from Delft University (Reinders et al. 2003). After a 
selection of the available records only 15 events were used in the statistical analysis. 
These records are related to previous FACTS version (2001) in which there are 17000 
recorded accidental events and only an 1.76% with natural causes. 
 
TAD by IChemE  
The IChemE database is a product of the Institution of the Chemical Engineers, an 
international professional membership organization for people who have an interest in 
and relevant experience in chemical engineering. In order to carry out the historical 
analysis only data about the industrial accidents triggered by flood and seismic events 
were extracted. The following Figure 9 shows an example of a record from the IChemE 
database for the seismic impact on a refinery with accompanying damage to a storage 
tank. This report represents the structure followed in this database to organize and to 
present the recorded data. The information is often very concise as in this case. In fact, 
there are no details about the type of structural damage and about the presence or 
release of stored substances and the release mechanism and path. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Example of a record from the IChemE database for an earthquake impact on an 
industrial plant. 
 
The IChemE database contains data obtained through different sources such as for 
example “Loss prevention bulletin”, or “Institute of Insurers” and the research of the 
stored records can be undertaken choosing specific keywords (which in the present work 
was only “flood” and “earthquake”). 
 
MARS 
The MARS (Major Accident Reporting System) is a database set up and maintained by 
the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre in Ispra (MAHB) that allows to carry 
out a complex text retrieval and pattern analysis. This database is used by EU and 
OECD (Organization for Economic co-operation and development) member countries to 
report industrial accidents in the MARS standard format and to exchange accident 
information on this basis.   
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For every record there are three sections: Report Profile, Short Report and Full Report. 
The Report Profile contains information to identify the event: date and place of the event, 
establishment (name and address plant, type of industry and Seveso status). All data 
contained in the Report Profile are confidential. 
 
In the other two sections it is possible to find more details about the causes of the 
accidents, the circumstances, the evolution and the consequences, and the responses 
to major accidents. The Short Report is public information and contains free text 
fields which allow the quick notification of available information about the accident within 
a few months, and contains fields such as immediate effects, substances directly 
involved, immediate sources of accidents, emergency measures taken, lessons learned 
and suspected causes. 
 
The Full Report is also confidential and contains far more detailed information about the 
accident and has both free text and predefined selection lists to control the input. It is 
prepared by the Competent Authorities after the event has been completely 
investigated (which could be several months or even years) and the causes, the 
evolution and the consequences of the accident are fully understood. 
  
The historical research of this database was carried out selecting among the suspected 
causes of the Short Report only the environmental causes. Only 32 accidental events 
were found of the 602 total records (Status September 2007) and of these only one 
event was related to floods. 
 
MHIDAS 
MHIDAS (the Major Hazard Incident Data Service) is a database managed by AEA 
Technologies Ltd. (Warrington,UK) by commission of the British Health and Safety 
Executive. This database contains information on 7000 accidents that occurred in 
transports, during process activity, or the storage of hazardous materials and with 
potential off-site impact. The impact generated by an accident comprises: number of 
fatalities, damage to the plants, to property and the environment. The stored files are 
based mainly on the information from dailies and then they are very schematic, concise 
and organized through keywords and often the reconstruction of the events is not 
immediate. 
 
Every record stored in MHIDAS is coded on the basis of a standard form including 
details like the involved hazardous substances, number of fatalities, number of injured, 
number of evacuation and a short description of the accident. In MHIDAS it is possible to 
find records from 95 countries, mainly from USA, UK, Canada, France, Germany and 
India. The historical research was carried out using the following keywords: 
 
o Seismic event: earthquake, 
o Flood event: flood, flooding 
 
We decided to analyse only 13 records related to flood events and 9 related to seismic 
events on the basis of the considerations done in the previous paragraphs.  
 
NRC 
The NRC (National response center) is the sole federal point of reference for reporting 
oil and the chemical spills in the USA. In fact, every day the National Response Center 
receives reports about the release of hazardous substances such as chemical, 
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radiological, biological and etiological discharges into the environment anywhere in the 
United States and its territories. The NRC contains all the received records in the 
national database where each file represents a particular calendar year and contains the 
data related to incidents which occurred during that year. Every record contains the 
following information frame: 
 
o Time and date of the accident 
o Location of the accident (City and State) 
o Incident type 
o Source and cause of the release 
o Type and quantity of the involved material 
o Number and type of injuries 
o Weather conditions 
o Medium affected 
o Emergency personnel respond 
 
In the NRC database it is possible to find some summaries (an example is shown in 
Figure 10) on the most significant industrial accidents. In fact, it publishes the summary 
reports periodically upon receipt of documentary information from the Federal On-Scene 
Coordinator. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of a record with the summary of a severe accident. 
 
The data can be accessed with Excel but the record do not always contain detailed 
information about the accident and the related scenarios. In fact, very frequently is only 
the presence of the release without specification of the source or the damage modality 
which led to the loss of containment is reported. 
 
In order to carry out the research in this database is not possible to refer to keywords but 
instead word filters were used. For example for this analysis we selected “natural 
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phenomena” and “flood”, “earthquake” in the available natural causes, and “storage 
tanks” and “pipelines” in the type of accident. It was not possible to quantify exactly the 
total number of accidents caused by floods because for every file related to one year the 
total number of records is around 30000 results. 
2.2 Data of interest 
The aim of this analysis was to research detailed information about industrial accidents 
triggered by seismic and flood events, in order to obtain enough data to improve the 
developed procedure for the assessment of the Natech risk. The data of interest can be 
different depending on the considered natural event. In the case of earthquakes some 
simplified vulnerability models are available in order to describe and to analyze the 
behavior of the equipment items during a seismic event. In fact, on the basis of the 
observational data some empirical functions have been developed, called “Probit” and 
they can be converted into fragility curves to quantify the probability of an equipment 
item to reach a given damage state. Nevertheless, these models are not available for 
every type of equipment item and the same degree of detail is not present in all models. 
Therefore, they need to be continuously improved to increase the reliability of the 
results. For seismic events the following data is required: 
 
o Data on the modalities of structural damage with and without release 
o Information about possible ignition which followed the release 
o Data on the typology of accidental scenario 
o Data on the typologies of equipments more involved 
 
In the case of a flood event, as was explained in the previous paragraphs, a correlation 
between the parameters of the characterization of the natural event and the impact on 
the equipment items still needs to be found. Therefore simplified vulnerability models are 
not available yet, consequently it is not possible to quantify the final value of the 
industrial risk indices. In the case of this natural event, besides the data listed above for 
the earthquake case, the following data needs to be collected: 
 
o Characterization of the typology of the flood event (flashflood or plain flood) 
o Data on the values of the water level and water velocity 
o Data on the correspondence between the parameters of the characterization of 
the flood event and the effects on the equipment items, in order to develop 
preliminary vulnerability models. 
o Examples of the link between the severity of flood event and to take place of 
accidental scenarios typical of the process industry. 
o All data useful to confirm the supposed damage modalities and consequent 
accident scenarios because of the flood impact on the industrial site (see Table 2 
a-b). 
 
Table 2 (a) Structural damage modalities for atmospheric tanks: cylindrical vertical vessels, 
D/H>1 (b) Schematization summarizing structural damage-final scenarios for the 
atmospheric vessels. 
a) 
Modality water impact Type of Structural damage Release 
category 
Complete failure of connected pipings R6 
Failure flanges and connections R3 
Slow submersion 
Detachment/opening vent valves R6 
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Modality water impact Type of Structural damage Release 
category 
Collapse for instability (catastrophic failure) R1 
Failure flanges and connections R3 moderate speed wave 
Detachment/opening vent valves R6 
Roof failure and Shell fracture R2 
Impact with/of adjacent vessels R1 
Complete failure of connected pipings R6 
High speed wave 
Failure of flanges and connections R3 
 
b) 
Final scenarios Damage typology Release 
category flammable toxic 
Catastrophic failure  R1 Pool-fire 
Fireball 
VCE 
Water 
contamination, 
dispersion 
Failure of roof or shell fracture  R2 Pool-fire 
VCE 
Water 
contamination, 
dispersion 
Impact of/with adjacent vessels 
or with trailed objects  
R1 Pool-fire 
Fireball 
VCE 
Water 
contamination, 
dispersion 
Failure of flanges and 
connections 
R3 Minor pool-fire, VCE Water contamination 
 
3. Accident analysis 
3.1 Criteria for the selection of accidents  
During the historical analysis of the data, we decided to define some selection criteria in 
order to identify only the most significant records for achieving our objectives. Therefore 
only accidents involving industrial activities and/or hazardous substances which have the 
potential to generate an accident event with off-site consequences (major accident), as 
for example refineries, storage site with high capacity, toxic gas production etc., were 
considered. These categories include not only industrial plants that fall under the Seveso 
Directive but also all the sites which could generate severe accidents because of stored 
or handled hazardous materials. Only the following equipment items were considered: 
 
o Loading and unloading transport: pipeworks, pumps and compressors 
o Storage: atmospheric/pressurized storage tanks, warehouses 
o Process: process vessels reactors, heat exchangers, pipeworks, pumps, 
compressors. 
 
The numerous accidents involving transformers were not considered, neither those 
related to small storage items like drums. Only in few cases connected to the flood 
impact it is possible to consider warehouses if the stored substances can react violently 
with water generating flammable and toxic gas. In this case a severe accident is possible 
only if a large amount is stored. 
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3.2 Limitations in the quality of the data 
During the historical analysis some limitations in the quality and availability of the data 
did not allow us to satisfy all the expectations relative to the developments of simplified 
models to apply in the procedure for the quantitative assessment of the Natech risk. As it 
is possible to see in Table 3, for every database the number of records related to the 
natural events is always very low. The real number of the Natech accidents could be 
higher because not all the events are correctly recorded. In fact, often the information 
sources are the journals where the events are published only if they have caused a 
strong social impact (for example a high number of fatalities). Also, when the natural 
events have only increased the severity of the accident, without representing the cause, 
they are often neglected; consequently not many data are available in order to carry out 
a complete and exhaustive analysis. 
 
Table 3. Natech events in the principal analyzed chemical accident databases. 
 
databases Total number of records % Natech events 
ARIA (BARPI) 30859 2-3 
FACTS (TNO) 22214 2-3 
ICHEME n.a. n.a. 
MARS (MHABS) 602 4-5 
MHIDAS (HSE) 7000 2 
NRC n.a. n.a. 
 
Other obstacles encountered in the present work were some limitations in the quality of 
the data; in fact, the available information is often fragmented and not very detailed. In 
most cases the reference to the damage of equipment items is only expressed in 
general terms, without specifying which modalities led to the loss of containment. In 
many records only the presence of the release is reported without indicating if the 
leakage came from a hole in the pipelines or from shell failure in a storage tank. 
Consequently, it is very difficult to reconstruct the dynamics of the accidents and to 
define what the most probable damage classes are that led to the final scenarios like 
fires, explosions, toxic clouds dispersion and water pollution. 
 
In the case of flood events very frequently the information about the type of flood and the 
water impact modalities is missing. Only in a limited number of records it was possible to 
find the values of the water levels and, in the rare cases, of the water velocity. In some 
cases it was possible to find the same information available in more databases and a 
comparison indicated how every database can report and highlight different details or 
information. In Figure 11 two examples of the same accident record from IChemE and 
from FACTS are shown. The record is related to the flood impact on a storage plant. In 
every database it is possible to find the information about: 
 
o The number of damaged equipment items: 50 
o The substance involved: propane 
o The kind of accident scenario: flash fire 
o The number of evacuated people: 11500 
o The effects on the equipments: storage tanks torn from the foundations and 
leakage of vapors from the pipe connections. 
 
In both cases the information is consistent, but the record from FACTS is more detailed 
and contains information less concise about the dynamics of accident and about the 
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capacity of damaged equipments. Then during a work of historical analysis the accidents 
repeated more than once in more databases have to be identified, the available 
information have to be compared and made homogeneous for the analysis. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
 
Figure 11. Records about the same accident obtained from (a) IChemE database and (b) FACTS 
database. 
 
4. Results of statistical analysis of accidents triggered by floods 
4.1 Characterization of the flood event 
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs it is important to find data about the natural 
event characterization to evaluate the different effects suffered by the equipment items 
depending on the severity of the flood event. In most records the natural event is 
described only in general terms, without specifying the exact value of the water level and 
speed, but giving a qualitative evaluation of the event.  
 
Analyzing the 272 records selected through the chosen criteria, only 70 more detailed 
accidents were identified and the information shown in Figure 12 was obtained. 
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Figure 12. Diagram with available information on the characterization of the flood event in 70 
more detailed records.  
 
Figure 12 shows that more data on the water level than the water speed is available, but 
in many cases (22 records) this information is missing altogether. Only 24 records gave 
information on the water depth. In the pie chart in Figure 13 the results obtained for 18 
records (from the 22 records excluding the cases with warehouses) are shown. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Distribution (number and per cent) of 18 records with the quantified value of the water 
depth.  
 
Only in 34 cases there was sufficient data to identify the link between natural event 
severity and the final scenario or effects on the equipments items, as shown in the 
following table. 
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Table4. Some examples of records with the link between severity of the event and effects  
(release or scenarios) on the equipment items.  
 
Accident record Characterization 
natural event 
Equipment 
involved 
Accident scenario 
(NRC) 19/07/2006 
Byghamton, NI 
Major flood event Storage tank 
(chemical facility) 
Fire, dispersion 
(NRC) 20/06/2006 
Sulfur, IA 
Major severity flood 2 underground 
storage tanks 
Release of 226556 m3 
crude oil 
(NRC) 29/03/2005 
Bloosmburg, PA 
High water level  Release and water contamination 
(NRC) 13/07/2005 
Austell, GA 
Major severity 3 underground 
storage tanks 
Released 49 m3, gasoline 
 
(NRC) 13/07/2004 
Sheffield TWP, PA 
Heavy flood  pipelines Release and water contamination 
(NRC) 14/08/2004 
Victorville, CA 
Flash flood chemical tanks and 
storage tanks 
Sulfuric acid, sodium hypochlorite 
and diesel release, 
water contamination 
(NRC) 28/07/2003 
Canton OH 
Heavy flood storage tank, piping 
 
Xylene released 0.056 m3, 
water contamination 
(NRC) 30/07/2003 Flash flood 2 underground 
storage tanks 
Fuel oil, 3.4 m3 
ground contamination 
(NRC) 12/11/2003 
Guajanilla PR 
Very heavy flood 2 oil/water 
separators 
Water contamination 
(NRC) 13/11/2003 
Ponce PR 
Heavy flood Storage tanks Water contamination 
(NRC) 18/11/2003 
League City TX 
High water level pipelines Water contamination 
(NRC) 25/04/2000 
Jellico TN 
High water level pipelines Water contamination 
(NRC) 24/06/2002 
South Willamsport 
High water level Storage tanks Water contamination 
(NRC) 19/12/2002 
Jonesboro AR 
Excessive water underground 
storage tank, piping 
Ground contamination 
(MHIDAS) 13/10/81 
Justin, Texas 
Heavy flood Storage tanks Gasoline and diesel fuel release 
Pool and vapour dispersion 
(ARIA) 
France 
1 m water level Pressurized 
storage tanks 
Release LPG 
(other source) 2002 
Spolana, Czech 
republic 
1.5 m, critical flow storage tank Release chlorine and water 
contamination 
(FACTS) high water level Storage tank Fire and water contamination 
 
(FACTS) 2000 USA high flow 2 Storage tanks Diesel oil propane, release 
water contamination 
(MHIDAS) 
30/01/2000 
Calacoto, Bolivie 
Flash flood Pipelines 
 
Water contamination 
(FACTS) 2005 
Australia 
high flow Storage tank Water contamination 
(FACTS) 2004 
USA 
.6-1.5 m, water 
level 
Storage tanks Ethylene, polyethylene, olefins, 
aromatics, acetylene release  
(ARIA) 1994 
USA 
high flow, 0.38-
0.508 m, 
37 Pipelines 
 
Fire and water contamination 
(FACTS) high flow Storage tanks Diesel, released 14000m3 
water contamination 
(ARIA) USA high flow Storage tanks Gasoline release, water 
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Accident record Characterization 
natural event 
Equipment 
involved 
Accident scenario 
contamination 
(FACTS) 25/11/2000 
Mohammedia, Maroc 
high flow, 1 m Storage tanks 
refinery 
Hydrocarbons release  
fire, water contamination, explosion 
(FACTS) 1990 
USA 
high water level Pipelines 
 
Water contamination 
(ARIA) 31/07/2002 
Manesti, Romania 
high flow Pipelines 
 
Water contamination 
(MHIDAS) 
11/06/2001 
Ecuador 
high flow Pipelines 
 
Natural gas release 
(ARIA) 4/12/2003 
Arles, France 
1.43 m Warehouse 
 
Phytosanitary products 
water contamination 
(ARIA) France 0.8 m Warehouse 
 
Phytosanitary products 
water contamination 
(ARIA) 4/12/2003 
Saint Gilles, France 
0.9 m Warehouse 
 
Phytosanitary products 
water contamination 
(ARIA) 27/12/1999 
France 
1 m Inorganic chemical 
industry 
Chemicals, released 2000 t 
(ARIA) 23/09/1999 
France 
0.4 m  Hydrocarbons release 
 
4.2 Equipment items involved and flood effects 
The historical analysis allowed the identification of the equipment item categories that 
are mainly involved in this type of accident. Figure 14 shows the obtained results 
through the statistical analysis of 272 records. Pipelines and storage tanks (atmospheric 
and pressurized) are the equipment items that are most susceptible to damage because 
of the flood impact. This conclusion does not surprise because these two categories of 
storage and transport equipment have a high substance hold-up and in the case of 
failure with loss of containment they can initiate accident scenarios with significant 
severity. It is also evident that atmospheric tanks are more vulnerable than pressurized 
tanks. In fact, a certain water level is sufficient to cause the collapse of the tank shell or 
to induce tank floating, while a high water speed is required to loosen the foundations 
(anchorage saddles) of pressurized vessels. 
 
Figure 15 shows the main impact of a flood event on the equipment items. These results 
were obtained analyzing only 66 records that had the required level of detail for this type 
of analysis. It is difficult to find information about the dynamics of the accident or about 
the suffered structural damages. In the selected records it was not possible to find many 
details about the flood effects on the equipments. The two cases of the roof failure have 
been considered even if they are not direct effects of the flood event; in fact also the 
floods due to heavy rains can cause frequently this typology of damage. 
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a) 
 
b) 
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Figure 14. Specific categories (a) of the equipment items mainly involved in accidents triggered 
by flood events and more general categories (b). 
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Figure 15. Effects suffered by the equipment items because of the flood impact. The results were 
obtained through the analysis of 66 accidents. 
4.3 Activities and substances involved in the accidents and 
consequences 
The analysis we performed allowed us as well to obtain useful information about the 
substances involved in the accidents. These results, shown in Figure 16, are coherent 
with the previous conclusions on the impact of floods on equipments categories. In fact, 
since the atmospheric storage tanks are the most vulnerable items, the most involved 
substances are gasoline, oil and diesel, usually stored in this kind of vessels. 
 
 
Figure 16. Substances involved in flood-triggered Natech accidents. 
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Since not all databases contain the same kind of information or details, some results on 
the industrial activities involved in Natech accidents and their consequences were 
obtained using the records only from MHIDAS, FACTS and ARIA. As we can see in 
Figure 17 this information is very general and in many records these data are not known.  
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
 
Figure 17. Histograms with the industrial activities involved in flood-triggered Natechs (a) and 
diagram with the consequences of the accidents on the basis of the records from 
ARIA, FACTS and MHIDAS.  
 
4.4 Accident scenarios caused by floods 
Another result obtained concerns the accident scenarios triggered by flood events, as 
reported in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Accident scenarios initiated by flood events. 
 
The most recurrent final scenario is water contamination. In fact, the released 
substances stratify and are spread by the floodwaters contaminating wide areas. 
Consequently, it is possible to have as secondary scenarios ground and underground 
waters contamination. 
 
In the case of a flood event two scenarios typical of the process industry - fire and toxic 
dispersion - can assume a different significance. In fact, if substances reacting with 
water are involved in the accident (see Table 5) and in a significant amount, it is possible 
that flammable or toxic gases are developed, generating fire or dispersion scenarios. 
In Table 6 the supposed scenarios are defined for the case of accident caused by flood.  
 
Table 5. Risk phrases of particularly hazardous substances in the case of a flood event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
phrases 
explanation 
R15 After contact with water it releases gas highly flammable 
R14 It reacts violently with water 
R14/15  It reacts violently with water developing extremely flammable gases  
R15/21 After contact with water it releases extremely flammable gases 
R29 After contact with water it releases toxic gases 
R31 After contact with acids it releases toxic gases 
R32 After contact with acids it releases highly toxic 
R51 Toxic for aquatic organisms 
R52 Noxious for the aquatic organisms 
R53 It can cause long-term damages to aquatic organisms 
R50/53 Highly toxic for aquatic organisms, it can cause long-term effects to the aquatic 
environment 
R51/53 Toxic for aquatic organisms, it can cause long-term effects to the aquatic 
environment 
R52/53 Noxious for aquatic organisms, it can cause long-term effects to the aquatic 
environment 
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Table 6. Probable scenarios caused by the impact of a flood event on an industrial site. 
 
Possible scenarios generated by floods 
Primary scenario: contamination of rivers and lakes. The severity is 
depending on the quantity and solubility 
Water contamination with 
significant damages to 
environment Secondary scenario: contamination of the ground and of the 
underground water 
Fires and explosions Pool-fires usually due to ignition of flammable substances spread by 
floodwaters 
Flash-fires o VCE generated by developed vapors 
 
Toxic clouds dispersion Clouds vapours/gas due to continuous release of collapse of the tank 
Flash-fires e VCE: developed in quantity enough to generate a cloud 
in the LEL and UEL limits 
Violent reactions with 
water and secondary 
scenarios The severity is depending on the quantity and CL50 
 
Our analysis confirmed the hypothesis about scenarios initiated by substances reacting 
with water. In fact, six examples were found with flood impact on warehouses and 
storage tanks with accompanying violent reactions with water, as shown in Table 7. The 
severity of these accidents is immediately evident because in three cases three different 
scenarios occurred. 
 
Table 7. Examples of records with violent reactions of chemicals with water. 
 
No Date Flood target substances Final scenarios 
1 1998 Warehouse Ca and H2 (after water 
contact) 
fire 
2 04/01/1987 Atmospheric storage 
tanks 
Nitric and sulphuric acids Toxic gas cloud 
dispersion 
3 25/11/1967 Warehouse Phosphorus Fire explosion 
Toxic gas cloud 
dispersion 
4 27/06/1982 Warehouse Sulphuric trioxide and oleum  explosion Toxic 
gas cloud 
dispersion 
5 08/1984 Warehouse Ca and acetylene (after 
water contact) 
fire explosion 
6 28/08/1983 Warehouse cyanide Toxic gas cloud 
dispersion 
 
5. Results of the statistical analysis of accidents triggered by 
seismic events 
5.1 Equipment items involved, structural damage categories and 
scenarios triggered by /earthquakes 
The same analysis as for flood-triggered Natech accidents was performed for 
earthquakes that triggered accidents in industrial sites. In contrast to floods, it is not 
difficult to find data about the severity and the return period of the seismic events 
because these data are available depending on the geographical coordinates. Simplified 
empirical vulnerability models are available for some equipment categories, thus it is 
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possible to calculate the final values of the industrial risk indices. Nevertheless the 
historical data are useful in order to support and improve the methodologies and the 
existent models.  
 
The results obtained through an analysis of 78 records, allowed to better clarify which 
process and storage equipment suffers damage during a seismic event (see Figure 19), 
which are the more frequent structural damages (figures 20-21) and which accident 
scenarios are more common (Figure 22). It was also possible to compare the different 
effects due to seismic and flood events. As for flood-triggered Natechs also in the case 
of earthquakes the most vulnerable equipment is the storage and transport items, 
however, the pressurized vessels have a higher resistance than atmospheric tanks. This 
conclusion does not surprise considering their different structure and the bigger 
thickness of the shell and also this result confirms the behavior of the owned 
vulnerability functions. In fact the available models for this category of equipments give 
very low values of damage probability. 
 
The pie chart in Figure 20 shows the distribution of the inflicted damage to transport and 
storage equipment. This result is interesting because it underlines the greater danger of 
this kind of accidents, since the probability of damage with loss of containment is higher 
than the probability of only structural damage and consequently they can more easily 
initiate accident scenarios. The details reported in the records allowed to define the five 
categories of possible structural damage with and without release available in Table 8. 
 
Figure 21 provides some examples of typical damage suffered by storage tanks during 
accidents triggered by earthquakes. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Categories of equipment items involved in accidents triggered by seismic events. 
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Figure 20. Per cent distribution of the different damage typologies. 
 
 
Table 8. Damage classes based on the analyzed historical data. 
 
Structural damage without release 
Minor Elephant foot buckling, deformation of support structures, stretching of the 
bolts.etc 
Moderate Detachment of the bolts, failure of the connections/weldings, roof top 
failure, failure of columns and support structures 
Structural damage with release 
Minor  Leak from flanges and connections 
Severe Failure with loss from roof top or shell 
Catastrophic Collapse or overturn tank with loss of complete inventory 
 
a) 
 
 
 
 
only structural 
damage
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no known
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damage with 
release
70%
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b) 
 
 
Figure 21a-b. (a) Sloshing damage to upper shell of tank (left), Elephant-foot buckling of the tank 
wall. (b)yielding of the support structures (left), collapse of the tank (right). 
 
 
Other information was obtained about the typologies of initiated accident scenarios 
(Figure 22). In many records (27 cases) these data were not available and the same 
number of scenarios was found for the case of fires and the pool without ignition, but 
considering both the pipelines and the storage tanks. 
 
The analysis was repeated selecting only the 29 records involving storage tanks and 
considering only flammable substances. This analysis allowed to deduce some 
interesting conclusions for example about the average number of the damaged 
equipment per event and the maximum number of involved equipments per event. The 
data about the number of structural damage with release and of those with ignition 
permitted to evaluate a preliminary ignition probability as shown in Table 9. 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Accident scenarios initiated by earthquakes. 
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Table 9. Results obtained from the analysis of 29 records related only to flammable substances. 
 
Number of seismic events 29 
Number of damaged equipment ≥254 
Max number of damaged equipments in one event 97 
Medium number of damaged equipments in one event 9 
Number of damaged equipments with release ≥180 
Number of cases of release with ignition ≥137 
Ignition probability 0.761 
 
 
6. Discussion 
Our study highlights the necessity to obtain a sufficient amount of detailed data in order 
to make an in-depth analysis or to develop modeling. It was also possible to assess how 
the databases report the same event underlining different aspects or neglecting others. 
Consequently the information, if available, is often fragmented and that makes the 
reconstruction of the dynamics of a Natech accident difficult. 
 
An aim would be to find a way to collect all the available information and to organize it 
systematically in one database only. The Institute for the Protection and the Security of 
the Citizen of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre in Ispra (VA) in 
collaboration with the Department of DICMA of the University of Bologna is laying the 
basis to prepare a specific database for only Natech events. At present a possible 
functional framework of the database has been outlined. The essential data to be 
included in the database comprise: 
 
o Accident code, location and date of the accident 
o Industrial activity 
o Type of the equipment (target): for example in the case of storage tanks it is 
important to specify the size and the capacity 
o Involved substance 
o Final scenario 
o Consequences: (number of injured, of dead, economic losses) 
o Cause of accident: (characterization of the natural event with severity and 
frequency parameter) 
o Abstract: short description with details about the number of the involved items, 
their condition at the time of the accident, and modalities of the damage which 
led to the loss of containment 
o Lessons learned  
 
The search of the records has to be possible through the use of specific keywords about 
the kind of natural event, the category of equipment involved or the accident scenario 
etc. 
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7. Conclusions 
The present work allowed to identify a significant number of technological accidents 
triggered by floods and earthquakes in industrial plants. Even though the real number of 
accidents could be higher because not all the events are reported or correctly recorded, 
it was possible to highlight some aspects which demonstrate that natural causes of 
accidents must not be neglected in the conventional quantified risk analysis. In fact, the 
obtained results indicate that: 
 
o The severity of the Natech accident scenarios is often higher because many 
items are damaged at the same time so multiple and simultaneous sources of 
release are generated; 
o The number of the possible scenarios can be higher for example in the case of a 
flood event because of additional scenarios (fire and dispersion due to 
flammable/toxic gases generated by contact with water); 
o Some categories of equipment may be more vulnerable or dangerous because of 
the impact of the natural events for example the pressurized vessels and the 
warehouses (for the storage of phytosanitary products or substances reacting 
with water). 
 
Furthermore the effects of the natural events on the equipment items can be 
summarized in the following points: 
 
o The items with the highest vulnerability during a natural event are storage tanks 
with the related connections; 
o The different vulnerability of the atmospheric and pressurized tanks depends on 
the type of the natural event; 
o The systems of pipelines and of pipeworks are very vulnerable to the natural 
event and represent a not negligible source of risk with high probability of 
release and environmental impact. 
o The storage of flammable substances generates very frequently scenarios of 
explosions and fires; 
o The water contamination scenario is very recurrent in the accidents triggered by 
floods. 
 
Consequently, the behavior of storage tanks and of all the equipment with high hold-up 
needs to be studied in detail to develop vulnerability models or to improve those 
available (for seismic events), in order to quantify the industrial risk generated by Natech 
events. As was discussed in previous sections, the carried out historical analysis does 
not allow to use directly the found data in order to take at this aim, nevertheless it is 
possible to follow a further approach for the vulnerability analysis. In fact, in the case of a 
flood event some simplified structural models can be used to correlate the resistance of 
equipment to the severity of flood event. The severity of the flood event can be 
quantified through the overall pressure acting on the equipment, which consists of the 
hydrostatic and hydrodynamic pressure. 
 
Therefore, for atmospheric storage tanks it is possible to calculate the critical pressure 
value which leads to the tank collapse, obtaining in this way a threshold limit value for 
the water level. For pressurized vessels it is useful to calculate the resistance of the 
support structures to the hydrodynamic pressure, through the analysis of the forces on 
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the bolts of the anchorage saddle. In this way it is also possible to obtain the threshold 
limit value for the water speed.  
 
At present this modeling is under development and represents a possible starting point 
for further developments and improvements of the procedure for the assessment of the 
risk to chemical installations due to by natural events. 
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Abstract 
 
The term Natech refers to natural disasters triggering technological accidents. In fact, because of the interaction 
between the natural and the industrial risk it is possible that several effects take place in industrial plants and in 
the storage sites, causing for example damage to pipelines, to process equipment, to storage tanks and 
consequently the release of hazardous materials. 
There are different kinds of natural events or, in general terms, of natural causes of industrial accidents 
(landslides, hurricanes, high winds, tsunamis, lightning, cold/hot temperature, floods, heavy rains etc.), 
nevertheless in the present study the attention is focused only on seismic and flood events. In fact, several 
accidents occurred in the last decades in industrial sites evidenced that typology of natural phenomena may 
cause severe damages to equipment items, resulting in losses of containment, thus in multiple and extended 
releases of hazardous substances. Because of these multiple and simultaneous failures with release, cascading 
events are more likely to occur during a natural disaster than during normal plant operation. Some examples of 
natech events like the flood in the Samir refinery in Mohammedia, Morocco, in 2002 or the Kocaeli earthquake 
in Turkey in 1999 are available in the scientific literature or in the accident databases . In both cases the natural 
event occurred in a refinery and involved several storage equipment items and generated fires and explosions. 
These reports allow to better understand the particular severity of the industrial accidents triggered by flood and 
seismic events. 
The reference for the prevention of chemical accident in the European Commission is the Seveso Directive II 
(96/82/EC). The aim of the Seveso Directive is Prevent Major accidents which involve dangerous substances 
and to limit their consequences for man and environment with a view to ensuring high levels of protection 
throughout Community in a consistent and effective manner. (Council Directive 1996) 
The Seveso Directive is addressed indirectly to Natech risk management; in fact it calls for the analysis of the 
external events in The identification and accidental risk analysis and prevention methods. The analysis of 
external events which can lead to chemical accident implies the consideration of the potential threat of natural 
hazards in the hazard analysis, and carrying out mitigation measures in case an accident occurs. 
Nevertheless the methodologies and the actions that can be taken to achieve these requirements are not 
specified and limited work has been devoted to the development of quantitative assessment procedures for 
Natech risk. 
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